The Contractor in the Combat Zone:
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| MOTU 7, the Problem Solvers. |
Sustainment Dependency and the Coming Logistics Reckoning
Logistics • Readiness • Wartime Sustainment
From Vietnam's Mobile Technical Units to the Littoral Combat Ship debacle, the Navy has steadily transferred organic maintenance capability to civilian contractors who hold proprietary technical data, cannot legally bear arms, and depend on air bridges that may not exist in a peer conflict.
- 9 yrs Average DDG-51 service life lost to maintenance (CBO, 2025)
- 50% CMV-22B average mission-capable rate 2020–2024 (NAVAIR)
- 28 Unresolved "catastrophic" V-22 risk assessments, avg. age 9 yrs (GAO)
- 2034 Year full Osprey gearbox fixes expected to be complete (NAVAIR)
The Problem Has a Name — and a History
In the years the United States fought in Vietnam, the Navy confronted a problem it had not fully anticipated: the ships deployed to the Gulf of Tonkin carried combat systems whose maintenance exceeded the organic technical capability of their crews. Radars, early digital computers, and fire control systems built by contractors to proprietary designs required contractor expertise to maintain. The institutional response was the Mobile Technical Unit — MOTU — a network of Fleet Technical Support Center activities stationed at Pearl Harbor, San Diego, Yokosuka, Rota, and other fleet concentration points, which deployed technical representatives as ship riders when a system exceeded the ship's organic repair capacity. MOTU-1 at Pearl, MOTU-5 at San Diego, MOTU-7 at Yokosuka: each served as a bridge between contractor technical knowledge and operational fleet requirements. [1]
The MOTUs worked because they acknowledged a structural gap and built a military-adjacent institution around it. Personnel held Fleet Technical Support Center credentials, operated under at least partial command integration, and maintained logistics pipelines with military priority. Parts that were not in the Navy supply system — because a contractor held the inventory as a proprietary business asset — could be expedited by air from the manufacturer to the theater. In Vietnam, that air bridge ran from CONUS to a theater where no adversary could threaten it. That condition no longer holds as a planning assumption. [2]
The deeper problem is that the structural gap the MOTUs were built to address has not narrowed in the sixty years since — it has widened. The systems are more complex, the contractor relationships more entangled, the proprietary data more jealously held, and the organic Navy maintenance ratings shallower relative to the systems they are notionally assigned to maintain. At the same time, the theater in which those systems must be sustained has changed in ways that make the Vietnam-era solution inadequate. A peer adversary with precision-strike capability, anti-ship ballistic missiles characterized as "carrier killers" and "Guam killers," and the electronic warfare depth to contest logistics pipelines all the way back to Hawaii presents a fundamentally different sustainment environment than the Gulf of Tonkin. [3]
What the Law Built — and What It Protects
The legal framework governing technical data rights in defense acquisition is not incidental to this problem — it is its structural foundation. Under the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) and the statutes it implements, data rights are generally determined by the source of funds used to develop the relevant intellectual property. [4] When a contractor develops technology at private expense, the government receives only limited rights to the resulting technical data — rights that explicitly exclude the ability to repair and overhaul equipment without contractor involvement, or to compete maintenance work to alternative vendors. [5]
A September 2025 GAO report — Weapon System Sustainment: DOD Can Improve Planning and Management of Data Rights — documents what this means in practice across the fleet. [4] Congress had specifically directed the study, with the Senate Armed Services Committee's FY2024 NDAA report expressing concern about "DOD's inability to properly conduct acquisition oversight of critical systems and procure the necessary data to maintain DOD systems in a timely manner." The GAO found that limited data rights had forced the LCS program to rely on original equipment manufacturers and prime contractors for maintenance, and recommended that Congress consider clarifying how DOD and contractors should treat data that constitutes both detailed manufacturing or process data and data necessary for operational maintenance — a distinction on which hundreds of millions of dollars in sustainment contracts turn annually. [4]
The Data Rights Framework: Three Tiers
Under DFARS 252.227-7013 and related provisions, DOD receives three tiers of rights to technical data depending on funding source: unlimited rights (government-funded development — full use, distribution, and repair); government purpose rights (mixed funding — can be used for government purposes including competing maintenance, but not released commercially); and limited rights (exclusively private-expense development — government may not repair, overhaul, or release to third parties without contractor authorization). [4] For the most capable modern combat systems — where contractors have deliberately structured development funding to maximize private-expense investment — limited rights are the norm. The result is a maintenance ecosystem in which the government owns the platform but rents access to the knowledge needed to sustain it.
The FY2026 NDAA signed December 18, 2025 shifted some emphases in acquisition policy, including expanded preferences for commercial products and portfolio-based acquisition with product support management built in. [6] Whether these reforms will materially improve government data rights on combat systems — or will instead accelerate contractor leverage over proprietary commercial technology — remains an open question as implementing regulations are developed through mid-2026. [7]
The Littoral Combat Ship: A Case Study in How Far This Can Go
No program in Navy history illustrates the endpoint of contractor-dependent maintenance doctrine more starkly than the Littoral Combat Ship. The LCS was deliberately designed around a minimal crew — approximately 40 personnel on Freedom-class ships, compared to roughly 350 on an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer — with maintenance needs to be met by contractors rather than organic shipboard capability. [8] What followed was documented by GAO, the CBO, and a series of Navy-internal reviews that together constitute a cautionary record.
The GAO's examination of LCS maintenance found that the LCS includes numerous commercial-based systems that are not used on other Navy ships, and that the Navy lacks sufficient manufacturer technical data to maintain many of these systems. [9] This is the proprietary data trap in its operational form: a warship at sea, unable to repair its own combat systems because the contractor holds the technical data and the tools, and because Navy personnel are contractually prohibited from touching certain equipment. Investigative reporting documented the human reality: sailors describing average weeks of "90 to 100 hours in port doing, honestly, nothing" while waiting for contractors to be cleared and flown to the ship; officers understanding their vessel as a "box floating in the ocean" without functioning weapons systems. [10]
The logistics geometry of the LCS contractor model makes the wartime problem explicit in peacetime terms. [9] Contractors are required to be American citizens. When an LCS visits a foreign port — Singapore, Bahrain, wherever the deployment takes it — contractors must be flown out at government expense to perform maintenance the crew cannot perform. In a permissive peacetime environment, this is expensive and inefficient. In a contested wartime environment where the ship is operating in the South China Sea, where the forward base it might put into is under missile threat, and where commercial aviation to the theater has been suspended — the contractor cannot get to the ship. The equipment the crew cannot legally touch stays broken. [9, 10]
The Navy has taken some corrective action. The FY2023 NDAA revised the LCS crewing structure, and GAO's recommendation that the Navy study how to obtain technical data for crew-performable maintenance was deemed "no longer valid" following those changes. [4] But the underlying proprietary data problem — which exists not only on LCS but on every platform where OEM-held technical data locks out government-organic maintenance — has not been resolved. It has been administratively managed.
"Sailors and officers were not allowed to touch certain pieces of equipment because of complicated arrangements with Navy contractors. Cumbersome negotiations meant it could sometimes take weeks to get contractors on board."— ProPublica investigation of the LCS program
The Carrier's Lifeline — and Its Fracture Points
The aircraft carrier and its strike group occupy a privileged position in this analysis because the carrier at least has a dedicated logistics aircraft — historically the C-2A Greyhound, now the CMV-22B Osprey — capable of delivering contractor personnel and out-of-supply-system parts directly to the flight deck. The independent surface ship — destroyer, frigate, amphibious vessel — has no such organic capability. Its logistics depend on UNREP from Combat Logistics Force ships, on opportunistic helicopter transfer, and on access to forward bases that may themselves be under threat. The distinction matters enormously in a war that pushes the logistics frontier back toward Pearl Harbor. [11]
The CMV-22B does represent genuine improvement over the C-2 in some dimensions. Unlike the Greyhound, which required catapult launch and arrested recovery and was restricted to daylight operations, the Osprey can operate from carriers, amphibious ships, destroyers, or unprepared ground, day or night, without catapults or arresting gear. [12] Its ability to deliver payloads directly to other ships in the strike group — without the intermediate step of landing on the carrier and transferring by helicopter — theoretically extends contractor logistics reach beyond the carrier itself. [13]
The problem is that the CMV-22B has already demonstrated, in peacetime, what happens when it becomes unavailable. In December 2023, the crash of an Air Force CV-22B off Japan prompted a three-month global grounding of virtually all Osprey tiltrotors. [14] The Navy surged its last operational C-2 Greyhound squadron — VRC-40 — to cover COD missions for both coasts simultaneously, with an aging fleet operating on borrowed time. A senior Navy aviation commander described the grounding as a "wakeup call," noting that "that train is running out." The last C-2s are scheduled to leave service in 2026. [14] If the CMV-22B fleet is grounded again — for reasons of safety, enemy action, or the unresolved mechanical issues that continue to accumulate — there will be no backup.
The December 2025 disclosure of the full scope of V-22 safety problems makes this vulnerability structural rather than contingent. In simultaneous releases from NAVAIR and the GAO, both agencies documented years of unresolved safety risks, poor cross-service information sharing, and a program culture that identified risks without implementing fixes. [15, 16] The NAVAIR review found average CMV-22B mission-capable rates between 2020 and 2024 of approximately 50 percent — meaning that on any given day, roughly half the COD fleet is not available for the mission it exists to perform. [15] The GAO found that the median age of the 28 unresolved serious and catastrophic system safety risk assessments was approximately nine years — risks formally identified nearly a decade ago that have not been resolved. [16] Full fixes to the proprotor gearbox failures responsible for multiple fatal crashes are not expected to be complete until 2034. [15]
The V-22 Safety Ledger: December 2025 Findings
The simultaneous NAVAIR and GAO reports released December 12, 2025 identified two primary mechanical failure modes in the V-22 drive system responsible for seven of twelve Class A mishaps since 2022: hard clutch engagements (sudden reengagement of the clutch connecting engine to proprotor gearbox, causing potentially unrecoverable loss of torque) and X-53 steel inclusions (metallic impurities in proprotor gearbox gears causing fracture and catastrophic drivetrain failure). [15, 16]
The NAVAIR review identified 28 unresolved "catastrophic" risk classifications — the highest hazard category — with an average age exceeding nine years. The review found that "cumulative risk posture of the V-22 platform has been growing since initial fielding" and that prior safety reviews in 2001, 2009, and 2017 produced recommendations that were "not fully carried out due to lack of follow-through." [15] Full fix implementation for the gearbox inclusion problem extends to 2034. Triple-melt gear delivery, initially planned for summer 2025, slipped to January 2026. Even with full triple-melt implementation, the risk will remain above the threshold that would be tolerated for initial military type certification of almost any other aircraft. [16]
The operational consequence for carrier logistics is direct: the CMV-22B is the only fixed-wing aircraft available to deliver contractor personnel and priority cargo to carriers operating independently in the Indo-Pacific. A 50 percent mission-capable rate and overwater flight restrictions imposed after the Japan crash limit that capability today. An adversary who understands the COD chain — and Chinese military intelligence assuredly does — has a soft-kill option against carrier strike group sustainment that does not require firing a single missile.
The Maintenance System That Cannot Meet Its Own Schedules
The contractor dependency problem is not limited to forward-deployed ships trying to sustain themselves in a contested theater. It is baked into the shore-based maintenance system from which those ships emerge — and that system is failing on its own terms in peacetime. The December 2025 Congressional Budget Office report on Navy ship maintenance analyzed maintenance events for destroyers and amphibious warfare ships from October 2010 through September 2024 and found a system in chronic disorder. [17]
The headline finding is unambiguous: CBO projects that DDG-51 class destroyers will spend an average of nine years — more than a quarter of their planned service life — out of the fleet for maintenance. That is more than twice as long as the Navy estimated when it developed its 2012 class maintenance plans for the ships. [17] Maintenance overhauls routinely take 20 to 100 percent longer than scheduled, the Navy has repeatedly revised its estimates upward, and the delays have continued to increase despite those revisions. [18] The Navy spent an average of $28 million per destroyer on maintenance in fiscal year 2024 — a 300 percent increase since 2009. [19]
The CBO identifies a bifurcated command structure as a contributing factor that has received insufficient attention: repair yards are overseen by regional maintenance centers, while modernization contractors — who work on the same ships simultaneously — are overseen by Naval Sea Systems Command. [20] The two groups do not share a schedule coordination mechanism. Modernization contractors have historically been permitted to operate without full schedule integration with the shipyard, producing conflicts and delays as they work on adjacent systems in the same hull. [20] This is not a theoretical problem — it is the day-to-day reality of destroyer maintenance for the workhorses of the surface fleet, measured across fourteen years of data.
The implications for wartime readiness are direct. If the peacetime maintenance system is already producing destroyers that spend more than a quarter of their service lives unavailable, and if the Navy's existing fleet numbers 296 battle force ships against a plan calling for 381, then the combination of maintenance delays and force structure shortfall produces an effective fleet significantly smaller than either the budget or the headcount would suggest. As the CBO observed, if maintenance events often take longer than planned, the Navy has, in effect, a smaller fleet. [17] The value of a single available destroyer day is estimated at $600,000. The losses attributable to chronic maintenance overruns are not small numbers.
When the Bases Are in the Hot Zone
The analysis so far has treated the shore-based maintenance and logistics system as a fixed backstop — expensive and slow, but available. The Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, the NAVFAC facilities at San Diego, the Fleet Technical Support Center activities that succeeded the MOTUs: these are the institutions to which the forward-deployed fleet turns when it needs repair beyond organic capability. The strategic question that has not been honestly confronted is what happens to this system when the threat axis extends to Hawaii.
The DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile — the system Chinese military doctrine explicitly characterizes as targeting Guam — has a maximum range in excess of 4,000 kilometers. Pearl Harbor is approximately 5,300 kilometers from the Chinese mainland: beyond current DF-26 range, but well within the envelope of other Chinese strike systems operating from forward positions. More immediately, the commercial air and sea corridors that supply the contractor logistics pipeline are vulnerable to interdiction through means well short of direct kinetic attack — threat-of-attack effects on commercial aviation, insurance market responses to war risk, and Chinese pressure on intermediate states through whose airspace and waters the logistics chain runs. [3]
The contractor field service representative who holds the proprietary technical data for a destroyer's electronic warfare system is in San Diego. His company's technical data servers are in Northern Virginia. The parts that are not in the Navy supply system — because the OEM holds the inventory as a proprietary spare parts business — are in a commercial warehouse in suburban Houston. In Vietnam, none of this geography mattered because the threat could not reach it. In a Western Pacific peer conflict, every link in that chain is a potential pressure point. The Navy has no tested plan for sustaining combat systems when the contractor pipeline is disrupted at the CONUS end. [2, 3]
The 2026 NDAA: Helpful at the Margins
The FY2026 NDAA, signed December 18, 2025, makes changes to defense acquisition that bear on this problem — though not as directly as the underlying issues demand. The legislation overhauls the DOD acquisition lifecycle and requirements process for major systems, shifting to a portfolio-based model with product support management built in from the outset. [6] It expands preferences for commercial products and services, recognizing that commercial innovation cycles may outpace traditional defense acquisition timelines. [6] It requires DOD to implement supply chain illumination requirements under which major systems contractors must disclose their supply chain structures — a provision with direct relevance to the out-of-system parts problem. [21]
The FY2024 NDAA, now being implemented, contained a contested logistics demonstration and prototyping program specifically directed at improving product support capabilities in a contested logistics environment. The FY2026 NDAA adds Japan and South Korea to the allied nations participating in that program — recognizing, implicitly, that allied sustainment integration is part of the answer. [21]
What the 2026 NDAA does not do is resolve the fundamental technical data rights problem in a way that would materially change the peacetime-to-wartime transition for combat system sustainment. The legislation's expansion of commercial product preferences may, if poorly implemented, increase contractor leverage over proprietary data rather than reduce it. The FAR and DFARS implementing regulations required within 180 days of enactment — by mid-June 2026 — will determine whether the portfolio-based acquisition model produces wartime-robust product support or simply repackages existing contractor dependency in new administrative language. [7]
A Way Forward
The problem is structural, and incremental adjustments will not resolve it. What is required is a deliberate, resourced program to buy down technical data rights on every combat-critical system in the fleet inventory, rebuild organic maintenance rating depth sufficient to sustain those systems without contractor presence, and develop a wartime contractor logistics doctrine that acknowledges honestly what civilian personnel can and cannot be ordered to do when the shooting starts.
On technical data rights: The GAO recommendation in its September 2025 report — that Congress consider legislative action to clarify the treatment of data that constitutes both detailed manufacturing or process data and operationally necessary maintenance information — is a necessary but insufficient first step. The Navy should conduct a systematic inventory of every combat-critical system for which it currently holds only limited data rights, prioritize acquisition of government purpose rights or unlimited rights based on wartime sustainment criticality, and fund that acquisition in the Program Objective Memorandum as a readiness investment rather than treating it as an unfunded wish. The F-35 program's July 2025 release of an intellectual property strategy — more than a decade after GAO first recommended it — illustrates both the direction and the pace of existing efforts. [4]
On organic maintenance depth: The LCS experience of sailors prohibited from touching their own equipment is an extreme, but the underlying trend — reduced rating depth relative to system complexity — is fleet-wide. The Navy should reassess the billet structure for electronics and combat systems ratings against the actual maintenance requirements of the current fleet, not against an idealized contractor-augmented model that assumes the contractor is available. The MOTU model worked because it supplemented organic capability rather than replacing it. The modern answer cannot simply be to recreate the MOTUs — though some analog of a wartime technical contractor corps with military command integration and prepositioned technical data access would address part of the problem. It must also rebuild the organic capability that makes that support supplemental rather than foundational. [1, 2]
On the COD chain: The Navy should treat the CMV-22B's 50 percent mission-capable rate and unresolved safety risk profile as a current operational emergency, not as a long-term sustainment management issue. The timeline to full gearbox fix implementation — 2034, according to NAVAIR — is incompatible with the 2027 threat timeline that informs current defense planning. Accelerating the triple-melt gear retrofit, resolving the hard clutch engagement issue, and developing contingency COD capability for the period when the CMV-22B fleet may be partially or fully grounded should be treated as urgent warfighting requirements. [15, 16]
On wartime doctrine: The Navy does not have a tested doctrine for sustaining combat systems when the contractor logistics pipeline is disrupted at the CONUS end. Developing that doctrine — which contractor personnel can legally be required to do in a contested zone under what authorities, how technical data can be transferred to government personnel in extremis, how out-of-supply-system parts will be sourced when commercial supply chains are disrupted — is a planning requirement that cannot be deferred until hostilities begin. The time for those agreements is in contracts, not in combat. [2, 3]
The Vietnam-era MOTU ship rider who flew from Pearl Harbor to a destroyer in the Gulf of Tonkin with a bag of proprietary spare parts and a technical manual he wasn't supposed to share was solving the same problem that confronts the Navy today — he just did it in an environment where the logistics tail was uncontested. The systems are more sophisticated, the contractor relationships more legally elaborate, and the proprietary walls higher. The threat environment is categorically different. A peer adversary with the reach, the precision, and the doctrine to contest logistics all the way back to Hawaii will find the seam between what the Navy can sustain organically and what it depends on contractors to provide. That seam is wider than it has ever been. The Navy should close it before the adversary finds it.
Verified Sources and Formal Citations
- Mobile Technical Unit Seven (MOTU-7) Unit History, Yokosuka Naval Base, 1963–1994. Together We Served / MOTU Seven Home Page. http://www.motuseven.graz-web.com/; Mobile Technical Unit 1, Naval Station Pearl Harbor. Together We Served. https://navy.togetherweserved.com/
- Moreell, B. (RADM). Seabee History and the Geneva Convention constraint on civilian contractor armed resistance. Naval History and Heritage Command. https://www.history.navy.mil; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GC III), Article 4, Aug. 12, 1949. OHCHR. https://www.ohchr.org/
- Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Sustaining the Fight: Resilient Maritime Logistics for a New Era. CSBA, 2020. https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/Resilient_Maritime_Logistics.pdf
- U.S. Government Accountability Office. Weapon System Sustainment: DOD Can Improve Planning and Management of Data Rights. GAO-25-107468. September 2025. https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-25-107468/index.html
- University of California Irvine Parliamentary Counsel Law Journal. "Give Us Our Tech Data: The Military's War Against Contractor Sustainment and Maintenance." April 2022. https://ucipclj.org/
- Government Contracts Legal Forum. "The FY 2026 National Defense Authorization Act." December 29, 2025. P.L. 119-60, signed December 18, 2025. https://www.governmentcontractslegalforum.com/
- Venable LLP. "NDAA 2026: The Next 180 Days Will Shape How Defense Agencies Award Contracts." January 2026. https://www.venable.com/
- Wikipedia. "Littoral Combat Ship." Updated February 2026. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Littoral_combat_ship; Reiher, CDR Dan, USN. "It Is Time to Single-Crew the LCS." Proceedings, January 2020. https://www.usni.org/
- U.S. Government Accountability Office. Littoral Combat Ship: Unplanned Work on Maintenance Contracts Creates Schedule Risk. GAO-21-172. April 2021. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-172; GAO. LCS: Actions Needed to Address Significant Operational Challenges and Implement Planned Sustainment Approach. GAO-22-105387. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-105387
- ProPublica / Military Times. "Eight Things You Need to Know About the Navy's Failed Multibillion-Dollar Littoral Combat Ship Program." September 2023. https://www.propublica.org/article/navy-littoral-combat-ship-takeaways
- Military Sealift Command. MSC Handbook 2025. U.S. Navy. https://www.msc.usff.navy.mil/
- NAVAIR. "CMV-22B Osprey." Naval Air Systems Command. https://www.navair.navy.mil/product/CMV-22B-Osprey
- Center for Maritime Strategy. "The CMV-22 Osprey: A Game-Changer for Today's COD and Tomorrow's Contested Combat Logistics Support." August 2024. https://centerformaritimestrategy.org/
- The War Zone / The Aviationist. "CMV-22 Grounding Was 'Wakeup Call' For Navy, Stakes Higher With C-2 Gone Next Year." April 8, 2025. https://www.twz.com/; "U.S. Navy Surging Last C-2 Greyhound Squadron As CMV-22B Osprey Remains Grounded." February 20, 2024. https://theaviationist.com/
- Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR). V-22 Comprehensive Safety Review. Released December 12, 2025. Reported in: USNI News. "New V-22 Mishap Reviews Find Material Issues with Osprey, Poor Communication Between Services." December 12, 2025. https://news.usni.org/; Defense One. "New GAO, Navy Reports Warn of Serious V-22 Osprey Safety Risks, With Some Fixes Stretching Into 2030s." December 12, 2025. https://www.defenseone.com/
- U.S. Government Accountability Office. Osprey Aircraft: Additional Oversight and Information Sharing Would Improve Safety Efforts. GAO Report on V-22, December 2025. Defense News. "GAO: Services Aren't Sharing Information on Longtime Osprey Problems." December 12, 2025. https://www.defensenews.com/; The Air Current. "V-22 Ospreys Have Serious Unresolved Safety Risks, NAVAIR Review Confirms." December 12, 2025. https://theaircurrent.com/
- Congressional Budget Office. Maintenance Delays for Conventional Navy Ships. December 10, 2025. https://www.cbo.gov/publication/61940; Full report PDF: https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2025-12/61507-ship-maintenance.pdf
- Stars and Stripes. "Navy's Destroyers Will Lose Roughly 25% of Their Service Lives to Maintenance, CBO Says." December 12, 2025. https://www.stripes.com/; Jane's Defence. "CBO Cites Continued US Navy Conventionally Powered Surface Ship Maintenance Delays." December 15, 2025. https://www.janes.com/
- Project on Government Oversight. "The Bunker: Capability Inflation." December 17, 2025. https://www.pogo.org/newsletters/the-bunker/2025-12-17
- Maritime Executive. "CBO: Better Planning Could Cut Down U.S. Navy's Drydock Delays." December 12, 2025. https://maritime-executive.com/
- Public Procurement International. "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 – Procurement Summary." (Including FY2024 NDAA contested logistics demonstration program, Section 842.) https://publicprocurementinternational.com/ndaa-fy2025-summary/
- Congressional Research Service. V-22 Osprey Aircraft: Background and Issues for Congress. R48703. September 12, 2025. https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48703/R48703.1.pdf
- The Air Current. "V-22 Ospreys Will Face 'Serious' Risks From Flawed Gears for Foreseeable Future." May 9, 2025. https://theaircurrent.com/
- The Aviationist. "V-22 Osprey Flights to be Restricted Until 2026." May 2, 2025. https://theaviationist.com/
- RAND Corporation. Naval Operational Supply System: Analysis of Alternatives. RR-2403. 2017. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2400/RR2403/RAND_RR2403.pdf
- Wills, LCDR Steven, USN (Ret.). "Confessions of a Former LCS Champion." Proceedings, December 2023. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/december/confessions-former-lcs-champion
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